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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Brian L. Buniva*
James R. Kibler, Jr."
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article addresses selected developments in environmental
law occurring between the publication of the 1992 Annual Survey of Virginia Law1 and June 24, 1994. Due to significant federal litigation since publication of the 1992 Survey, this article
places primary emphasis on those developments which most
significantly affect potential liabilities under state and federal
environmental laws. This article addresses developments in the
federal and state legislative and regulatory schemes, and case
law from Virginia state courts, the United States District
Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Virginia, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and Fourth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court.
II. AIR
A. Legislation and Regulation
The EPA designated the greater Richmond metropolitan area

* Director, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; A.B., 1972,
Georgetown University;, J.D., 1979, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond. Mr. Buniva is past Chair of the Environmental Law Section of the Virginia State Bar. Mr. Buniva is currently Chair of the Administrative Law Section of the
Virginia Bar Association, Council Member of the Environmental Law Section of the
Virginia State Bar, and Vice Chair of the Environmental Law Section of the City of
Richmond Bar Association. He is active in the American Bar Association's Section on
Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law (SONREEL).
** Associate, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; B-A., 1985, University of Virginia; J.D., cum laude, 1993, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. Theodore R. Kingsley & Carole M. Agee, Environmental Law: Annual Survey
of Virginia Law, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 729 (1992).
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as a "marginal" ozone nonattainment area.2 In response, the
1993 Session of the General Assembly enacted legislation requiring the State Air Pollution Control Board (Air Board) to
implement
a motor vehicle emissions inspection program for the
3
area.
The 1993 General Assembly also added major modified stationary air pollution sources to the list of sources requiring
certification by a local governing body. In order to obtain certification, the location and operation of the facility must be consistent with all ordinances adopted pursuant to Chapter 11 of
Title 15.1 of the Code of Virginia. In addition, the General
Assembly shortened the time period in which the local governing body can provide certification from 120 days to 45 days.4
The General Assembly also added air permit conditions to
the list of violations which may lead to enforcement actions
against the operator by the Air Board. The operator may also
face civil or criminal penalties. This bill further raised the
standard for a criminal offense to a knowing violation and
raised the fine to $10,000 per day.5
Responding to Citizens for Clean Air v. State Air Pollution
Control Board,6 the General Assembly enacted a statute providing standing to any person who: (1) is aggrieved by a final
decision of the Board; (2) participated in the public comment
process in person or by submitting written comments; and (3)
exhausted all available administrative remedies.7 The standard
set forth in the statute generally follows the standing requirements imposed under Article III of the United States Constitution.8

2. 40 C.F.R. § 81.347 (1993).
3. Act of Apr. 29, 1993, ch. 2, 1993 Va. Acts 7 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
46.2-1176 to -1187 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
4. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 739, 1993 Va. Acts 1038-39 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1321.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
5. Act of Feb. 23, 1993, ch. 13, 1993 Va. Acts 11 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
10.1-1316, 1320 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
6. 13 Va. App. 430, 412 S.E.2d 715 (1991). Citizens for Clean Air was commented on in the 1992 Survey. See Theodore R. Kingsley & Carole M. Agee, Environmental Law: 1992 Survey of Virginia Law, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 729, 734 (1992).
7. Act of May 7, 1993, ch. 997, 1993 Va. Acts 2067-77 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1318 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
8. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (discussing federal
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Legislation enacted in 1993 requires the Air Board to provide
a description of any newly enacted regulations that are more
restrictive than applicable federal requirements to the standing
committee of each House of the General Assembly with jurisdiction over the matter.' The Board must also state the reasons
for the more restrictive provisions. °
The 1994 Session of the General Assembly passed legislation
prohibiting the Air Pollution Control Board from collecting
annual permit program fees until the federal Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) approves the Board's Title V operating
permit program, unless the Governor determines that fees are
needed at an earlier date to maintain state primacy over the
operating permit program." The 1994 General Assembly also
enacted a statute requiring the Air Board to create a voluntary
air emissions banking and trading program. Lawmakers expect
the program to: (1) result in net air emission reductions; (2)
create an economic incentive for reducing air emissions; and (3)
to accommodate economic growth through a voluntary program.
The Air Board must consider both mobile and stationary sources, offsets, and the impact of interstate or regional emissions
trading that may accrue from the Clean Air Act amendments of
1990 and regulations adopted by the EPA pursuant to the creation of the emissions banking and trading program.'
The General Assembly enacted legislation in 1994 in response
to litigation arising out of a Botetourt County cement
manufacturer's plans to burn waste materials to power its operation. The new legislation prohibits most local ordinance
amendments, except those solely related to open burning, from
regulating emission sources required to register with the Air
Board or from obtaining an Air Board permit. 3 The General

constitutional requirements for standing).
9. Act of Mar. 23, 1993, ch. 456, 1993 Va. Acts 540-44 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1308 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1308 (Repl. Vol. 1993).

11. Act of Apr. 4, 1994, ch. 227, 1994 Va. Acts 327 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
10.1-1322 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). For a summary of the Title V permit program, see
Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air Act Primer (pt. 3), 22 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10301 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (1992).
12. Act of Apr. 2, 1994, ch. 204, 1994 Va. Acts 294 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
10.1-1322.3 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
13. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 358, 1994 Va. Acts 502 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
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Assembly also prohibited the Air Board from requiring a source
to obtain an additional permit or permit modification certificate
for the use of alternative fuels or raw materials if the owner
demonstrates to the Board that the alternative fuel or raw
material emissions will drop in relation to emissions from prior
fuels. 4
The Air Board promulgated a series of regulations in response to activity by the EPA and Congress' passage of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990."5 In regulations effective
January 1, 1993, the Air Board revised its policy concerning
new and modified stationary source permits to reflect changes
in the state's nonattainment permit requirements mandated by
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.' In other regulations
effective the same date, the Board amended regulations covering emission standards for volatile organic compounds (VOCs)
and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from stationary sources in the
Northern Virginia, Richmond, and Hampton Roads
nonattainment areas. The regulatory amendments require
sources to report levels of emissions and to limit VOC and NOx
emissions levels consistent with the use of Reasonably Available
Control Technology (RACT).'7
In other areas, the Air Board amended its regulations to
incorporate, by reference, the latest edition of the American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists Handbook,
the recently promulgated federal New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), and the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP). s This amendment updates
Appendix M of the Board's regulations which lists all of the
non-statutory documents and the primary federal regulations

10.1-1321(B) (Gum. Supp. 1994)).
14. Act of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 717, 1994 Va. Acts 1040 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-1322.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
15. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 103, 104 Stat.
2399, 2399-2712 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 88 7401-7671 (Supp. IV. 1992)).
16. Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution-New and Modified Stationary Sources, § 120-08-01, 9:3 Va. Regs. Reg. 289 (1992).
17. Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution-Emission Standards for Volatile Organic Compounds and Nitrogen Oxides from Stationary Sources,
§ 120-01-01, 9:5 Va. Regs. Reg., 606 (1992).
18. Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution-Documents Incorporated by Reference, § 120-05-0501, 9:5 Va. egs. Reg. 630 (1992).

1994]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1045

incorporated by reference into the Board's regulations. 9 The
Air Board also adopted regulations effective January 1, 1993,
requiring most gasoline stations to implement Stage 2 vapor
recovery systems to minimize the emission of volatile organic
compounds from the refueling of automobiles.' Additional regulations effective September 1, 1993, amended the Board's provisions concerning the prevention of significant deterioration
(PSD) areas, and made the provisions generally coincide with
federal definitions and procedures.2 ' By regulations effective
April 1, 1994, in response to the General Assembly's delegation
of a motor vehicle emissions inspection program,' the Air
Board established an enhanced motor vehicle inspection program for the Northern Virginia ozone nonattainment area.'
The Air Board also promulgated regulations to clarify provisions pertaining to the procedure for maintaining an action, the
statutory basis for such an action, and the appeal process.'
B. Case Law
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990' authorize the EPA
Administrator to establish an acid rain control program by
limiting emissions allowances of certain utilities.26 The EPA's
final regulations permit utilities to comply by adding sulfur
dioxide controls ("scrubbers"), by switching to low sulfur content
coal, or by purchasing allowances through a limited emissions
trading program.27 Utilities installing scrubbers are allowed to
19. Id.
20. Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution-Emission Standards for Petroleum Liquid Storage and Transfer Operations, § 120-04-3701, 9:3 Va.
Regs. Reg. 277 (1992).
21. Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution (Revision MM,
Prevention of Significant Deterioration-VR 120-01-01, VR 120-01-02, VR 120-08-02), §
120-01-01, 9:22 Va. Regs. Reg., 3860 (1993).
22. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-1176 to -1187 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
23. Regulation for the Control of Motor Vehicle Emissions, §120-99-03, 10:8 Va.
Regs. Reg., 2173 (1994). As of this writing it is unclear whether the EPA will approve the Virginia program.
24. Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution-Definitions (Part
I) and General Provisions (Part 11), § 120-01-01, 9:6 Va. Regs. Reg. 867 (1992).
25. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671
(Supp. IV 1992)).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7429(BX4).
27. 40 C.F.R. §§ 72, 73, 75, 77, 78 (1993).
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apply for a two-year extension of the compliance deadline, and
are eligible to receive additional allowances." The additional
allowances create strong incentives for utilities to install scrubbers. Anticipating a heavy demand, Congress required the Administrator to process extension applications "in order of receipt" to reward those who timely initiate making technological
improvement."
In Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that federal courts
lack jurisdiction, under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean
Air Act,3 to compel the EPA Administrator to process extension applications. According to the Fourth Circuit, the
Administrator's nondiscretionary duties under section 7651c
extend only to a requirement to process applications in the
order received. 2 Thus, the court asserted that the Administrator did not abuse his discretion by failing to process any applications until he promulgated final regulations, even though he
missed the Congressionally-mandated filing deadline by several
months. 3
III. SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
A. Legislation and Regulation
Issues regarding the Commonwealth's waste management
policy continued to receive attention from the General Assembly
in 1993 and 1994. The 1993 Session of the General Assembly
enacted several measures relating to waste management, including a bill to exempt state governmental agencies from the
Waste Management Board's 'financial responsibility requirements.' Significantly, the Assembly also acted to permit
certain facilities to continue receiving solid wastes until they

28. 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(d).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(dX3).
30. 980 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1992).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
32. Monongahela Power Co., 980 F.2d at 277-78.
33. Id.
34. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 837, 1993 Va. Acts 1212 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-1410 (Repl. Vol. 1993)). Prior to the amendment there was an implied understanding that state agencies were not exempt from the regulations.

1994]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1047

reach their vertical design capacity, provided, inter alia, that a
registered professional engineer certifies that the facility does
not qualify as an open dump (i.e., that the facility or leachate,
or residues therefrom do not pose a threat or hazard to-human
health and the environment), and that the facility complies
with financial assurance regulations.'
Legislative enactments from the same Session clarify that
criminal prosecutions under the Waste Management Act must
be commenced within three years after discovery of the
offense.3 6 Amendments also extend the moratorium on the issuance of new permits for infectious waste incinerators until
the state Air Pollution Control Board and the Virginia Waste
Management Board complete promulgation of regulations."7
While waste-related measures approved by the General Assembly during the 1994 session were fewer in number than
those enacted in the previous session, the potential impact of
the legislation is likely to have a long-term effect on Virginia
industry. For instance, in its recent session, the Assembly
adopted legislation broadening the Department of Environmental Quality's voluntary pollution prevention assistance program.' The Assembly also enacted the Reduction of Heavy
Metals in Packaging Act, establishing permissible concentration
levels of lead, cadmium, mercury, and hexavalent chromium in
packaging, and further prohibiting the sale or offer for promotional purposes of such packaging components after July 1,
1995. 39
In regulations effective January 13, 1993, the Virginia Waste

35. Acts of Mar. 23, 1993, chs. 469, 476, 1993 Va. Acts 560, 569 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993)). The owner or operator of the facility was
required to make a submission by Oct. 9, 1993 to obtain the benefit of the statute.
Id. The open dump criteria are found at 40 C.F.R. Part 257.
36. Act of Feb. 24, 1993, ch. 23, 1993 Va. Acts 23 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
10.1-1455 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
37. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 721, 1993 Va. Acts 1009 (noted in Editor's Note at
VA. CODE. ANN. § 10.1-1308 (Cure. Supp. 1994)) (amending and reenacting §§ 3-4 of
Chapter 751, §§ 3-4 of Chapter 773, and §§ 3-4 of chapter 774 of the 1992 Virginia
Acts of Assembly).
38. Act of Apr. 1, 1994, ch. 169, 1994 Va. Acts 264 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
10.1-1425.10, -1425.12, -1425.19 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
39. Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 944, 1994 Va. Acts 1572 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-1425.20 to -1425.25 (Cure. Supp. 1994)).
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Management Board adopted Amendment 12 to the Virginia
Hazardous Waste Management Regulation to reflect changes in
EPA regulations dealing with wood preserving operations, industrial boilers and furnaces, corrections to its toxicity characteristic rule, and other miscellaneous changes.'4 Other regulations promulgated by the Agency include amendments to the
Solid Waste Management Regulations, 41 amended regulations
governing the transportation of hazardous materials to reflect
federal requirements,' 2 and amendments to the Hazardous
Waste Management Regulations pertaining to wood preserves. 4' In addition, the Board for Waste Management Facility Operators adopted final regulations establishing certification requirements and standards of practice for waste management facility operators.'

40. Virginia Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, 9:6 Va. Regs. Reg. 921,
VR 672-10-1 (1992). Due to the length of the regulation, the Virginia Register of Regulations contains only a summary of the new provisions. The full text is available
from the Registrar of Regulations or from the Department of Environmental Quality.
41. Solid Waste Management Regulations, 9:10 Va. Regs. Reg. 1567, VR 672-20-10
(1993). These regulations incorporate changes in the Virginia Waste Management Act

enacted by the General Assembly, bring Virginia regulations into compliance with
amended federal regulations for municipal solid waste landfills, and make other administrative changes. The administrative changes include requirements that the results of public participation on permits-by-rule be placed on the record transmitted to
the department by the operator, and that the department follow case decision requirements when denying or suspending emergency and experimental permits. The amendments also encompass such technical requirements as set-back distances from highways, variances from requirements for ground water monitoring and composite liners
for sanitary landfills, and exemptions for mulch, used animal bedding, burning of
wood wastes, and certain management practices resulting from mineral mining. See
id.
42. Regulations Governing the Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 9:11 Va.
Regs. Reg. 1783, VR 672-30-1 (1993).
43. Virginia Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, 10:8 Va. Regs. Reg. 2235,
VR 672-10-1 (1994). Due to the length of the regulations, the Virginia Register of
Regulations contains only a summary. The full text is available from the Registrar of
Regulations or from the Department of Environmental Quality.
44. Waste Management Facility Operators Regulations, 9:21 Va. Regs. Reg. 3720,
VR 674-01-02 (1993).
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B. Case Law
1. Commerce Clause Issues
The United States Supreme Court continues to adhere to the
principles enunciated in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,'
where the Court held that the transportation and disposal of
solid waste are part of the stream of interstate commerce.' In
accordance with this theory, state or local regulations that discriminate against or excessively burden the waste industry
violate the dormant commerce clause.' In several decisions,
notable primarily because they demonstrate both local sentiment against out-of-state waste and the Court's steadfast adherence to City of Philadelphia, the Court repeatedly struck
down local or state regulations that impede the interstate flow
of both hazardous and nonhazardous waste.' The most recent
of these decisions, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown,4 invalidated a local flow control ordinance which
required that solid waste handled within Clarkstown be processed at the town transfer station.
States and municipalities typically enact flow control ordinances to ensure that a waste stream is sufficient to ensure
adequate financial operation of a facility or a franchise. Often
the ordinance is necessary to retire indebtedness arising from
the construction of resource recovery or other capital-intensive
waste management facilities. A flow control ordinance requires
all waste generated within a locality to be delivered to specified
45. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
46. Id at 622 (citing Bowman v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888));
see also id. at 626 (referring to out-of-state shipments of solid waste as "articles of
commerce").
47. Id. at 627-29; see also id. at 624 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
48. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994) (finding flow control ordinance invalid); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl.
Quality of Oregon, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994) (imposing fee on out-of-state solid waste
invalid); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992) (invalidating statute protecting local waste producers from
competition from out-of-state waste producers); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt,
112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (finding an unequal fee on out-of-state hazardous waste invalid).
49. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).

1050

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1041

facilities." Disposal fees (sometimes called "tipping fees") are
typically higher at resource recovery facilities than at landfills
and therefore flow control ordinances generally act to displace
competition. For this reason, and because national and regional
waste hauling firms typically own their own landfills and waste
treatment facilities, the waste industry strongly opposes flow
control measures.
In Carbone the Supreme Court ruled that the flow control
ordinances do not discriminate against the waste itself, but
affect the "service of processing and disposing of it." 51 The flow
control ordinance in question denied a waste processor access to
other less costly disposal facilities and as a result, was held to
discriminate against interstate commerce.52
The Fourth Circuit rendered two decisions concerning medical
waste incinerators and transporters. In Medigen of Kentucky,
Inc. v. Public Service Commission,' the Fourth Circuit struck
down a West Virginia statute requiring transporters of infectious medical waste to obtain a certificate of convenience and
necessity in order to operate in the state. In Medical Waste
Assoc. v. Mayor of Baltimore,'4 however, the court left intact a
zoning ordinance which allowed a medical waste incinerator to
accept only waste generated within the city limits. The court
held that City of Philadelphia did not apply because the city
had not erected a city-wide barrier against out-of-state waste,
but merely limited the waste that this particular incinerator
could accept. 5 The court noted that under the Pike v. Bruce

50. Id. at 1678; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-28.01 (Cum. Supp. 1994)
(permitting certain localities to require delivery of refuse to designated waste disposal
facilities).
51. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1679.
52. Id. The immediate effect of Carbone may be to diminish the ability of resource recovery facilities to obtain credit. See Martha M. Canan, Supreme Court's
Ruling on Waste Stirs Credit Fears Among Analysts, THE BOND BUYER, May 17, 1994,
at 1.
53. 985 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1993).
54. 966 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 150-52 (adopting what the court calls a "single facility exception" to the
per se rule of City of Philadelphia to comport with the practical way cities and counties solve regional waste problems). The Fourth Circuit also held that the incinerator
could not challenge the enactment of the ordinance because it acceded to the limiting
clause in order to obtain political approval for the rezoning. As such, the court opined
that the incinerator's claim was barred by constitutional estoppel. Id. at 152-53. Medi-
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Church test,56 the need to meet emergency regulations and to
prevent medical waste from polluting the Chesapeake Bay were
legitimate public interests outweighing the "incidental" burdens
on interstate commerce.57
2. CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 ("Superfund" or "CERCLA7)' continued to generate most of the federal environmental litigation in
the Fourth Circuit during the past two years. As a result, the
Fourth Circuit continues to decide some of the most contemporary issues in American environmental litigation.
CERCLA provides a cause of action to any person who incurs
costs59 in responding to a "release" of hazardous substances at
any "facility." ' ° Liability is strict, joint and several 6 for those
who qualify as a "responsible person" under the statute.62 Responsible persons include the current "owner or operator" of the
facility,' any person who "owned" or "operated" the facility at
the time of "disposal" of the hazardous substances, 64 any person who "arranged for the disposal or treatment" of hazardous
substances at the facffity,6 and any person who accepted the
hazardous substances for "transport to disposal or treatment
facilities."' As the defenses are few in number and limited in
scope,67 most litigation under the statute has focused on
whether a potentially responsible party (PRP) qualifies as an

cal Waste Ass'n was amended after the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in
Fort Gratiot and Hunt.
56. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
57. 966 F.2d at 150-52.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
59. The costs must be "necessary" and "consistent with" the National Contingency
Plan to be recognizable in a private cost recovery action. Id. § 9607(aX4XB).
60. Id. § 9607(a).
61. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167-71 & nn.13-14 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aXl).
64. Id. § 9607(aX2).
65. Id. § 9607(aX3).
66. Id. § 9607(aX4).
67. See id. § 9607(a)-(b).
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"owner," "operator," or "generator/arranger," and whether there
was a "disposal" of hazardous substances at a "facility." This
article addresses these five primary questions in turn.
a. Owner
CERCLA does not expressly define the interests rising to the
level of "ownership" for purposes of the statute. A working
definition can be gleaned through considering the exceptions."
For example, a secured creditor, "who, without participating in
the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility" does not constitute an "owner" or "operator."69 The
scope of the secured creditor exemption has been an object of
attention in 1994 in light of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Kelley
v. EPA7" striking down the EPA's lender liability rule.7 '
In United States v. McLamb," a decision which rested on
the statute, and not EPA's lender liability rule, the Fourth
Circuit considered the liability of a lender who obtained a security interest in land as collateral for a loan. The owner defaulted, and the lender exercised his rights as beneficiary under the
deed of trust to foreclose on the property." At a foreclosure
sale, the lender was the only bidder.74 It purchased the property, took title, and listed the property with realtors several
days later. 5 At some point after foreclosure (but prior to selling the property nearly seven months later) the lender learned
that the property was contaminated. 6

68. See id. § 9601(20XA)-(D) (1988).
69. Id. § 9601(20XA).
70. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Kelley, the court ruled that the EPA lacked
authority to restrict private rights of action arising under CERCLA. Id. at 1108. For
its part, however, the EPA has stated that it will nonetheless continue to apply the
lender liability rule, in its discretion, when seeking to recover costs from PRPs. See
generally Edward B. Sears & Laurie P. Sears, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Uncertain Times for Lenders, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,321 (1994) (discussing the impact of Kelley on secured creditors).
71. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 -.1105 (1993).
72. 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 70.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The purchaser and other subsequent landowners brought a
CERCLA contribution claim 77 against the lender, asserting
that the security interest exemption did not apply because the
lender held more than "an indicia" of ownership when it took
actual title at the foreclosure sale.7" The district court granted
summary judgment to the lender and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the lender purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale only because there were no other potential
buyers. Further, because the lender immediately took steps to
list the property with realtors and did not use or manage the
land during its brief ownership, evidence existed to support the
lender's claim that it was acting solely to protect its security
interest.7 9 The court also refused to read into the statute a
requirement that a lender act in a "commercially reasonable"
manner in order for the exemption to apply. 0
Another significant but indirect exception to "ownership"
liability arises under the so-called "innocent purchaser" defense.
Section 107(b)(3) of CERCLAs' exempts from liability those
defendants who establish that a release or threat of release was
caused solely by a third party who was not an employee or
agent of the defendant and whose act or omission did not occur
in connection with a contractual relationship between the defendant and the third party. 2 In order to avail himself of the defense, a defendant must prove that he acted with "due care"
considering the circumstances and characteristics of the substances involved." Courts have construed this provision to exempt owners from liability if they have undertaken measures
to
84
investigate the facility which amount to "due diligence."

77. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988).
78. 5 F.3d at 70.
79. Id. at 72-73.
80. Id. at 74.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(bX3) (1988).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. One seeking to avail himself of this defense must comply with the definition
of "contractual relationship" by demonstrating, inter alia, that at the time of acquisition, the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous
substance was dispersed at the facility. Id. § 9601(35).
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In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,' a general partnership, which owned the site of a battery recycling facility, sought protection under the innocent
purchaser defense. The battery recycling facility began operation on the site in 1971.' The partnership bought the land in
1973 and subdivided it into four parcels. Soon thereafter, the
recycling facility moved its operations from one parcel to another. Thirteen years later, and three months after receiving notice
of potential hazardous waste contamination on the site, the
partnership transferred two of the parcels to the general partners and their spouses, individually. 7
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the partnership
argued that because the recycling facility moved its operations
shortly after it acquired the property, the location must have
been contaminated prior to the 1973 transaction." The partners and their spouses similarly argued that the later transaction afforded protection to the individual defendants.89 Both
arguments were rejected. Because the court found that the
harm to the site was indivisible, it refused to apply the parcelby-parcel distinction urged by the partnership and the individual defendants.' Further, because the partnership received notice of contamination prior to transferring the property to the
general partners and their spouses, the court imputed this
notice to the individual defendants. As a result, the court found
both the partnership and the individuals jointly and severally
liable.9
Other decisions have clarified the duration and quantum of
ownership interest necessary to give rise to ownership liability.
In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co.,9 the Fourth
Circuit held that the duration of ownership is irrelevant for

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1280.
Id.
Id.

90. Id. at 1280-81.
91. Id. The spouses also claimed "innocence" with respect to knowledge of the
contamination. The court likewise rejected this argument, holding that the spouses
could have made an "appropriate inquiry' under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35XB) by propounding a simple question to their mates. Id. at 1281.
92. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
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purposes of establishing liability under section 107(a)(2),9' but
may be considered during the contribution phase of litigation
under section 113(f)(1). 4 In Portsmouth Redevelopment &
Housing Authority v. BMI Apartments Associates,95 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that a wife's dower rights to a hazardous waste site, being
"merely inchoate" under Virginia law, did not constitute a sufficient ownership interest to impose liability under section
107(a).'
Courts have permitted corporate successors to be liable for
the acts of predecessor corporations under CERCLA, although
the statute is silent on the issue. However, the Fourth Circuit's
first ruling on the issue broadened the scope of potential liability beyond that previously imposed by other courts. In United
States v. Carolina Transformer Co.,97 the court adopted the
positions of the Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits 98 holding that
CERCLA permits successor liability. The Fourth Circuit stopped
short of mandating successor liability, preferring to impose liability when "justified by the facts of each case."'
An interesting aspect of CarolinaTransformer is the Fourth
Circuit's adoption of a second theory of successor liability under
the "mere continuation" exception of the traditional rule.0 0
Normally, a corporation which acquires the assets of another
corporate entity does not also acquire its liabilities.' In this
case, there was no overlap in stock ownership between successor and predecessor, which took the successor out of the scope
of the traditional rule.0 2

93. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX2) (1988).
94. 966 F.2d at 844; see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(fXl) (1988).
95. 827 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va. 1993).
96. Id. at 359. The court left open the issue whether the wives had sufficient
authority to control the site to qualify them as "operators" under § 107(a) and Nurad.
Id.
97. 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).
98. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1029 (1989).
99. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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The district court adopted a more liberal theory referred to
as the "continuity of enterprise" or "substantial continuity" approach. This theory was borrowed from labor relations cases,
and looks at a series of factors in determining successor liability.'
Because in this case the successor's operation was in
substance a continuation of the former corporation, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling imposing ownership

liability."'
In a decision predating Carolina Transformer, the United
State District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that a successor to a sole proprietorship could be held liable
under the same "substantial continuity" or "continuity of enter0 5
prise" theory."

b. Operator
In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co.," a property owner sought reimbursement from previous owners and
tenants for its costs of response in removing underground
storage tanks ("USTs") and their hazardous contents. The plaintiff argued that the former owners and tenants were liable as
"owners" or "operators" of the facility at the time of disposal of
the hazardous substances. 7

103. These factors are:
(1) retention of the same employees; (2) retention of the same supervisory
personnel; (3) retention of the same production facilities in the same
location; (4) production of the same products; (5) retention of the same
name; (6) continuity of assets; (7) continuity of general business operations; and (8) whether the successor holds itself out as the continuation
of the previous enterprise.
Id. at 838 (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985));
cf Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987). The Fourth
Circuit also noted that an attempt to transfer "clean" assets and leave liabilities
behind should also be considered. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d. at 838.
104. Id. at 840-41; see also Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Research
Co., 847 F. Supp. 388, 399 (E.D. Va. 1994) (applying Carolina Transformer and the
.substantial continuity" theory).
105. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1266
(E.D. Va. 1992).
106. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
107. Id. at 840.
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The Fourth Circuit held that the district court applied the
proper standard in determining whether the tenants were operators of the UST site."~ The district court examined the
tenants' leases and determined that the tenant defendants
lacked the "authority to control the operations or decisions
involving the disposal or hazardous substances at the site or
the contents of the USTs." 1'
Nurad also helped to define the scope of liability of corporate
officers as operators under CERCLA. In Nurad, the plaintiff
sought recovery from the two former vice-presidents of the
corporation who initially installed the USTs. The officers were
sons of the company's president and majority stockholder, who
was known to be a strong-willed individual and ran "the entire
affairs of the corporation.""' Because the evidence suggested
that the authority of the two sons "was entirely subordinate to
that of their father," "'

the Fourth Circuit held that the dis-

trict court did not err in finding that the father/CEO retained
all decision-making authority over the company and its operations, and that the sons could not be held liable as
operators."'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Carolina
Transformer Co."' is the sequel to its decision in Nurad. In
CarolinaTransformer, the court held a father and son team of
corporate officers liable as "operators." This decision was based
on their admission that they were responsible for the operations
of the company at various times when the company disposed of
hazardous wastes."
Berger v. City of North Miami,"' a CERCLA cost recovery
action, arose in an unusual way. In Berger, the city of North
Miami, Florida leased low-lying property to Munisport, a
closely-held corporation. Munisport used a portion of the site as
a landfill to raise the low level of the terrain and to defray the

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 842.
Id.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 837.
828 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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expense of building two golf courses on the site."'

In six

years, the landfill accepted over six million cubic yards of solid
waste including some known toxic wastes." 7 After Munisport
was faced with permit revocation, it ceased operation of the
landfill and the corporation was subsequently dissolved."'
EPA placed the landfill on its CERCLA "National Priorities
List," and the city entered into a consent decree agreeing to
assume liability for the remediation of the site."'
The treasurer of Munisport, one of two controlling shareholders, died in Virginia. North Miami filed a notice of claim
against the estate, in probate proceedings alleging that the
decedent was liable for a portion of the cleanup costs."2 The
estate's personal representative filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, seeking a declaration that the decedent was not
liable under CERCLA. A flurry of counterclaims and crossclaims involving the other officers and shareholders in the
decedent's business, the city, and the construction and engineering contractors hired to develop the property followed. The
major issues before the court were whether the defendants
could be held liable as operators or generator/arrangers under
CERCLA and whether the defendants were liable to the city
under Florida's laws for contribution. 2 '
Citing Carolina Transformer, the court examined each
defendant's authority to control the facility. The court held the
corporate officers, except the corporate secretary, liable as operators due to their authority to control the operations of the entire venture, regardless of their day-to-day involvement in the
venture's landfill component and irrespective of whether they
held a majority of the corporation's stock." However, the attorney who served as corporate secretary, provided legal advice,
and held approximately 15% of the corporation's shares, lacked

116. Id. at 404.
117. Id. at 405.
118. Id. at 406.
119. The EPA "urged all potentially liable parties under CERCLA to undertake
[the necessary] remedial action voluntarily." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 407.
122. Id. at 411.
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"meaningful decision-making authority" to control the facility
and was therefore found not liable as an operator.' Similarly, an independent contractor who provided technical and engineering services but did not have authority to make "final operational decisions" was not liable.'
In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone. Co. of Virginia v. Peck
Iron & Metal Co.," the court denied plaintiffs summary judgment against two estates because the estates were closed, the
assets fully distributed, and the beneficiaries' only connection to
the decedents' activities was by virtue of inheritance." s This
decision seems consistent with the innocent purchaser defense
for persons who acquire ownership interests by inheritance or
bequest.'
c. Generator/Arranger
The defendants in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia v. Peck Iron & Metal Company' collected
spent lead-acid batteries and sold them to a recycler. The defendants argued that "the mere sale of raw materials, commodities or products used in another company's manufacturing process," constituted a sale of "useful, valuable material," rather
than simply arranging for the disposal of hazardous wastes.'2 9
The district court disagreed, limiting the "useful product" exception to those instances where the transaction involved a new
and useful product containing a hazardous substance.'
Because the batteries were no longer useful as batteries, the
transaction was merely intended to "get rid of them" and as
such constituted arranging for treatment of a hazardous
waste. 3 '

123. Id. at 411-12.
124. Id. at 413.
125. 814 F. Supp. 1285, motion denied, 822 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Va. 1993).
126. 814 F. Supp. at 1292.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35XAXiii) (1988).
128. 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
129. Id. at 1275.
130. Id.; see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. United States Gypsum, 711 F. Supp. 1244,
1254 (D.N.J. 1989).

131. 814 F. Supp. at 1275-76 & n.7.
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In a later decision in Chesapeake & Potomac,'32 the court
held the defendants liable as arrangers. The defendants did not
manufacture but nonetheless arranged for the disposal of leadacid batteries directly and indirectly, through a "middleman,"
with knowledge that the batteries were ultimately destined for
the site." 3 However, a "true indirect seller" who had no
knowledge that the batteries were bound for the site was held
not liable because the middleman, not the seller, "made the
decision" to send the batteries to the site."3
d. Disposal
Under the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Nurad, Inc. v. William
E. Hooper & Sons Co.,"' mere ownership of a parcel of a contaminated site is virtually tantamount to liability as an owner
"at the time of disposal." 3 ' In Nurad, the court was faced
with claims by two defendants that no "disposal" of hazardous
wastes occurred during their ownership. The first defendant
installed underground storage tanks (USTs) for mineral spirits
and later abandoned the tanks and sold the land. 3 " A subsequent purchaser never used the USTs, but the evidence suggested that the tanks leaked gradually over time during both
periods of ownership." As to the first owner, the court held
that the mineral spirits were "disposed of" when the owner shut
down operations and abandoned the tanks."9 The subsequent
owner was also found liable because, in the court's view,

132. 814 F. Supp. 1293 (E.D. Va. 1993).
133. Id. at 1298-1301.
134. Id. at 1300-01; see also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal
Co., 822 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Va. 1993).
135. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
136. Id. (construing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988)). CERCLA borrows the definition of
"disposal" employed in the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29).

The SWDA defines "disposal" as:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of
any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that
such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may

enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).

137. 966 F.2d at 840.
138. Id. at 840-41.
139. Id. at 846.
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CERCLA does not require a CERCLA plaintiff to determine the
"precise point" at which leaking began. 40 The evidence suggesting "gradual and progressive" contamination was sufficient
to hold the subsequent owner liable, even in the absence of
affirmative human conduct.'
In Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. BMI
Apartments Assoc.,' the court held an allegation that the defendants "moved some dirt around" in the course of constructing
buildings on a previously contaminated site was legally sufficient to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)." That is, it
was conceivable that the plaintiffs could establish that the construction activity falls within the definition of "disposal" under
CERCLA.2"
e. Facility
The Fourth Circuit narrowly defined the term "facility" in
Nurad."' Because the USTs, and not the larger parcel itself,
were construed to be the "facility," the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the tenants who had no control over the USTs could not
be held liable as operators. 46
Conversely, in Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Atlantic Research Corp.,47 the defendant leased and contaminated only a portion of a larger twenty-acre tract which was already contaminated. The district court refused to limit the
defendant's liability to the portions it leased, holding that "facility" encompassed the entire contaminated site and the defen-

140. Id.
141. Id. at 845-46; see also United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 16465 (4th Cir. 1984).
142. 827 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va. 1993).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(bX6).
144. 827 F. Supp. at 358; see also United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 734
F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
837, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
145. "Facility" is defined to include the "area where a hazardous substance has
been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
146. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842-43.
147. 847 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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dant was free to raise the same arguments in the contribution
phase of the litigation.'
f. Response costs
CERCLA casts such a wide liability net that often a potentially responsible party's best defense is to argue that the
plaintiffs response costs were neither necessary nor consistent
with the National Contingency Plan. Compliance with the plan
is a predicate to actual recovery in a private cost recovery action.'
One area of contention is litigation costs and
attorney's fees. The statute contains no express provision 50
for private cost recovery actions and the courts were split on
the issue 5 ' until the Supreme Court resolved the matter in
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States. 2
The Key Tronic court held that attorneys' fees in a private
cost recovery action are recoverable only to the extent the fees
are "closely tied to the actual cleanup." 5 ' In Key Tronic, work
of counsel in identifying other potentially responsible parties-work that, in the Court's words, "might well be performed
by engineers, chemists, private investigators or other professionals who are not lawyers"-was recoverable." These services,
the Court added, do not fall under the American rule. The
American rule denies recovery of attorneys fees absent explicit
statutory authorization "because they are not incurred in pursuing litigation."'55
148. Id. at 395-96 & n.7. It appears the district court was unpersuaded that the
"harm" was "divisible" and thus found the entire site to be the facility.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX4XB) (1988).
150. Attorneys fees are recoverable under CERCLA in limited circumstances: by
the prevailing party in a citizen's suit to enforce the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f), in
abatement actions, by a person erroneously ordered to pay response costs, §
9606(b)(2XE), and in actions brought by employees claiming discrimination based on
disclosure of statutory violations, § 9610(c). The government's right to recovery of
attorneys' fees as a cost of enforcement has been largely undisputed.
151. Compare Board of Supervisors v. Fiberglass Eng'g Co., Civ. Action No. 891454-A (E.D. Va. 1990) with Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal
Co., 826 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Va. 1993) (decided before Key Tronic reached the opposite
result).
152. 114 S.Ct. 1960 (1994).
153. Id. at 1967.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (10th Cir.
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On the other hand attorneys' fees incurred by private litigants bringing a cost recovery action and negotiating with the
EPA were not recoverable pursuant to the American rule.156
The Court noted that while a cost recovery action itself was initially a judicially-created remedy, 57 to further imply an award
of attorneys' fees would stretch the statute too far." In addition, explicit grants of attorneys' fees in certain sections 59 indicates an intent not to prohibit such fees in other actions, and
a cost recovery action too far removed from a cleanup to qualify
as an "enforcement activity."'6 Negotiations with EPA were
seen as "primarily protecting Key Tronic's interests" and not as
necessary costs of response.'6 '
g. Miscellaneous CERCLA Cases
In White v. County of Newberry, 6' the Fourth Circuit held
that the plaintiffs state law inverse condemnation claim and
CERCLA cost-recovery action could be heard together in federal
district court. Both claims were alleged to have resulted from
the county defendant's disposal of hazardous substances.'6
The court found that because both claims asserted that the
county's disposal of hazardous substances damaged plaintiffs
well, the claims arose out of a common nucleus of operative
fact," and therefore the district court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim." The Fourth Circuit
also held that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was
1993)).
156. Id. at 1968.
157. CERCLA originally contained no explicit provision permitting private cost recovery. Federal courts found an implied right before Congress amended CERCLA by
SARA in 1986 to provide an explicit cost recovery right in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). See
Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
158. 114 S. Ct. at 1967.
159. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9606(bX2XE) (1988) (reimbursement awarded in an
abatement action may include appropriate costs and fees); 42 U.S.C. § 9610(c) (1988)
(assessment of costs and expenses against violator shall include attorneys' fees).
160. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
161. Id. at 1967.
162. 985 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1993).
163. Id. at 170.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1988); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966).
165. White, 985 F.2d at 171.
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not an abuse of discretion under the Burford6 ' abstention
doctrine, because concerns about federal overreaching into highly specialized state enforcement or remedial schemes were not
presented by the facts of that case.' Ultimately, however, the
court barred recovery under either theory because the plaintiffs
failed to show that the defendant had used or deposited
the
16
well.
their
contaminated
that
substance
hazardous
In United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co.,"' the Fourth
Circuit refused to uphold the district court's dismissal of an
EPA cost recovery action. This was despite the fact that the
EPA's on-scene coordinator misrepresented his academic credentials and government attorneys failed to disclose and obstructed the defendants' efforts to discover the discrepancies."7 The court held that cases should be decided on their
merits, and that dismissal was too severe a sanction."' On
remand, the Fourth Circuit instructed the district court that it
may deny the government the benefit of those portions of the
record or the right to recover any expense which may have
been tainted by misconduct." 2
In Berger v. City of North Miami,7 ' the court held that a
CERCLA defendant's breach of contract claim asserted as recoupment action in response to a contribution suit under section 113 did not "arise out of the same transaction or occurrence" as the CERCLA claim and were therefore barred. v4 According to the court, any breach of "contractual obligations
relating to the success of the ...

project has no necessary,

logical relationship to any of the parties' liability for contamina-

166. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943) (holding that although a
federal equity court may have jurisdiction over a particular matter, the court may
exercise its discretion to "refuse to enforce or protect legal rights, the exercise of
which may be prejudicial to the public interest" (quoting United States v. Dern, 289
U.S. 352, 360 (1933)).
167. White, 985 F.2d at 172.
168. Id. at 174-75.
169. 11 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 1993).

170. Id.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 463.
Id.
820 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Va. 1993).
Id. at 993.
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cleanup opera-

2. RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA)176 is a cradle-to-grave regulatory scheme that, inter
alia, gives the EPA the authority to regulate the generation,
transportation, handling, treatment, and disposal of hazardous
wastes. 7 The EPA has been delegated the authority to determine which wastes are hazardous and therefore subject to the
stringent requirements of Subtitle C.178 Nonhazardous wastes
are regulated under subtitle D, but to a much lesser extent. 9
In 1980, the EPA promulgated hazardous waste designations
for solid wastes, and included in the regulation the so-called
"household waste exclusion." This exclusion exempted regulation
of residential waste and the residues thereof that may remain
after treatment from regulation under Subtitle C.80 Through
enactment of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984,181 Congress added resource recovery facilities incinerating nonhazardous commercial and industrial waste to the list of
those facilities exempt from the Subtitle C regulations.'8 2
These regulations affected owners and operators of hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs)."
Most of the environmental community, including the EPA, interpreted the statute and the regulations as exempting the ash
residue from incineration of residential, commercial, and industrial non-hazardous waste from regulation as a hazardous
waste.
The United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed with
this interpretation in City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
175. Id. at 993-94.
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
177. These wastes are covered by Subtitle C, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934.
178. Id. § 6921(a).
179. See Subtitle D, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949.
180. Identification & Listing of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(bXl) (1993).
181. Hazardous & Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat.
3221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
182. 40 C.F.R. § 261 (1993).
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i).
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Fund.' In a seven to two decision, the Court ruled that the
plain words of the statute exempted only the facility that treats
non-hazardous waste, and that the ash residues therefrom must
be disposed of as hazardous waste if they are sufficiently toxic."8 The practical import of this decision is that the approximately 150 facilities in the United States which are comparable
to those in City of Chicago' must routinely employ the "Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure" (TCLP) test on ash residues. If the residues exceed parameters established by regulation, the ash must be disposed as hazardous waste. Alternatively, some facilities should be able to alter the combustion process to ensure that the ash is nonhazardous. 87
Two Fourth Circuit decisions pertaining to RCRA are notable.
In Fiekema v. Texaco, Inc.," the court ruled that an EPA administrative consent order under section 7003 of RCRA preempts state injunctive relief claims, but not claims for money
damages. Meanwhile, in Palumbo v.Waste Technologies Industries,89 the court held that technical violations of the EPA
permitting process do not rise to the level of "imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment" under
RCRA's judicial review provisions.' As a result, such claims
fall under the circuit courts' exclusive jurisdiction over direct
appeals of the permitting process and may not be raised in
federal district courts as collateral challenges to the validity of
permits.' 9 ' The court also ruled that the Burford.9 abstention doctrine'93 denies federal courts jurisdiction over challenges to state agency permitting decisions."

184. 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994).
185. Id. at 1592; see 40 C.F.R. § 261 (1993).
186. See 114 S. Ct. at 1598.
187. See Martha M. Canan, Court's Ash Ruling Unlikely to Affect Local Credits
Now, Rating Agencies Say, THE BOND BUYER, May 5, 1994, at 3.
188. 16 F.3d 1408 (4th Cir. 1994).
189. 989 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1993).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(aX1XB) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
191. Palumbo, 989 F.2d at 160-61.
192. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
193. See supra note 162.
194. Palumbo, 989 F.2d at 159.
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WATER

A. Legislation and Regulation
The 1993 Session of the General Assembly enacted legislation
requiring the state forester to protect state waters from sediment deposition pollution resulting from silvicultural activities.195 This legislation authorizes the forester to issue special
orders requiring loggers to cease silvicultural activities and
implement corrective measures.'O Under certain circumstances, the forester may issue ex parte emergency orders directing
the owner or operator to comply.' The legislation provides
for penalties of up to $5;000 per day or the collection of civil
charges in lieu of penalties.'98 The General Assembly also designated the Department of Conservation and Recreation as the
lead agency for nonpoint source pollution programs, including
coordination of state programs under section 319 of the Clean
Water Act and section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Management
Act.'9

The 1994 General Assembly repealed the provision of the
State Water Control Law which authorized an award of
attorneys' fees and costs when the Commonwealth prevailed in
enforcement actions. 2"
In 1993, the State Water Control Board adopted regulations
to establish a Corrective Action Plan General Permit. The General Permit incorporates elements of the Corrective Action Plan
permit and the Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) permit for cleanup of sites contaminated with
petroleum products at leaking Underground Storage Tank
(UST) sites. The General Permit regulation was designed to
provide flexibility to the regulators, as well as to reduce the
expense and time required to file for coverage on the part of
195. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 948, 1993 Va. Acts 1535 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 10.1-1105, -1181.1 to -1181.7 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
196. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1105, -1181.2.
197. Id. § 10.1-1181.2.
198. Id. §§ 10.1.1105, -1181.1 to -1181.7.
199. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 830, 1993 Va. Acts 1203 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-104.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
200. Act of Apr. 8, 1994, ch. 489, 1994 Va. Acts 696 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
62.1-44.23 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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the regulated community. 20 ' The Water Board also established
a fee assessment and collection system, 2
created above
ground storage tank pollution prevention requirements,"cl established ground water withdrawal regulations to implement
the Ground Water Management Act of 1992,' and conformed
its regulations to amendments to the Virginia Petroleum Under
Ground Storage Tank Fund (VPSTF) article of the State Water
Control law. °5 In addition, the Water Board promulgated regulations establishing VPDES Permits for stormwater discharges
from certain heavy manufacturing facilities;' light manufacturing facilities;2 7 transportation facilities; landfills, steam
electric power generating facilities, and other waste management facilities; "° construction sites; ° and nonmetallic mineral mining.21 °
In addition, the former Council on the Environment issued
guidelines for preparing environmental impact assessments
concerning oil and gas well drilling operations in Tidewater,

201. Corrective Action Plan (CAP) General Permit, 9:8 Va. Regs. Reg. 1270 VR
680-14-11 (1993).
202. Fees for Permits and Certificates, 9:18 Va. Regs. Reg. 3233, VR 680-01-01
(1993).
203. Above-ground Storage Tanks Pollution Prevention Requirements, § 6 9:18 Va.
Regs. Reg. 3240 (1993).
204. Ground Water Withdrawal Regulation, 9:24 Va. Regs. Reg. 4500, VR 680-14-12
(1993). These regulations do not apply to withdrawals of less than 300,000 gallons
per month. 1.5, 9:24 Va. Regs. Reg. 4502.
205. Petroleum Under Ground Storage Tank Financial Requirements, 10:1, Va.
Regs. Reg. 131, VR 680-13-03 (1993).
206. Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) General Permit
Regulation for Storm Water Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity from
Heavy Manufacturing, 10:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 4018, VR 680-14-16 (1994).
207. Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) General Permit for
Storm Water Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity from Light Manufacturing
Facilities, 10:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 4041, VR 680-14-17 (1994).
208. Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) General Permit
Regulation for Storm Water Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity from
Transportation Facilities, Landfills, Land Application Site and Open Dumps, Materials
Recycling Facilities, and Steam Electric Power Generating Facilities, 10:15 Va. Regs.
Reg. 4061, VR 680-14-18 (1994).
209. Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) General Permit
Regulation for Storm Water Discharges from Construction Sites, 10:15 Va. Rgs. Reg.
4084, VR 680-14-19 (1994).
210. General Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) Permit
Regulation for Nonmetallic Mineral Mining, 10:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 4099, VR 680-14-20
(1994).
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Virginia.2 ' These regulations were later repromulgated by the
Department of Environmental Quality, reflecting the statutory
consolidation of Virginia's environmental agencies."'
B. Case Law
James City County's long-running dispute with the EPA over
the proposed Ware Creek reservoir again came before the
Fourth Circuit in 1993. In an earlier decision (JCC ),21 the
Fourth Circuit held that the EPA's record did not contain substantial evidence to support its finding that James City County
had practical alternatives to building the reservoir, and remanded the case for the EPA's determination whether environmental considerations alone would justify its section 404(c)2 14
veto of a permit for the destruction of wetlands.2 15 In James
City County v. EPA (JCC II),"6 the court upheld the EPA's
final determination that the proposed project would have "unacceptable adverse effects on the environment."21 In the court's
view, the EPA had authority to consider only the environmental
consequences even though the Army Corps of Engineers is required to weigh such interests against the overall public interest."8 Given the EPA's findings that the project would destroy
approximately 1200 acres of wetlands, and the habitat for small
animals, invertebrates, reptiles, amphibians, fish, Great Blue
Herons and Black Ducks, the court opined that the veto was

211. Guidelines for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Assessments for Oil
or Gas Well Drilling Operations in Tidewater, Virginia, 8:17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2777 VR
305-02-01 (1992).
212. Guidelines for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Assessments for Oil
or Gas Well Drilling Operations in Tidewater, Virginia, 10:1 Va. Regs. Reg. 88, VR
304-02-01 (1993).
213. James City County v. EPA, 955 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1992) (JCC 1), remanded,
1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17 675, No. 89-156-NN (E.D. Va 1992), reversed, 12 F.3d 1330
(4th Cir. 1993). JCC was commented upon in the 1992 Survey. See Theodore R.
Kinglsey & Carole M. Agee, Environmental Law, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 729, 748-49
(1992).
214. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
215. JCC I, 955 F.2d at 259.
216. 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, No. 93-2045, 1994 WL 286422 (U.S.
Oct. 3, 1994).
217. Id. at 1334.
218. Id. at 1335-36.
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supported by the record, and thus was not arbitrary, capricious,
or unsupported by substantial evidence.219
The Fourth Circuit had three occasions to consider the sufficiency of the evidence for criminal convictions under the Clean
Water Act22 and application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 1 In each of the three cases, the court found the evidence sufficient to convict the defendants of knowingly discharging pollutants into waters of the United States'
and
affirmed the sentences imposed.
In United States v. Schallom,' the Court affirmed the sentence of a construction worker who, when repairing a bridge,
sprayed a concrete mixture into the stream below and allowed
dried cement to fall into the creek when trimmed from the
bridge above. 4 The court held that wet cement is a "chemical
waste" and that dried cement is a "solid waste" under 33 U.S.C.
section 1362(6).'
In the second case, United States v. Law, 8 a corporation
and its sole officer and shareholder were each convicted of
knowing violations where the corporation discharged acid mine
drainage on at least sixteen occasions without an NPDES permit 7 The corporation and its owner were each fined $80,000
and the owner was sentenced to two years in prison.2" On
appeal, the defendants argued that they owned only the surface
rights to the parcel and that the owners of the mineral estate
were liable for the discharge.'
The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the conviction, holding that the defendants knew that a dis-

219. Id. at 1339. In JCC II, the Fourth Circuit instructed that because § 404(c)
determinations are to be made "after notice and opportunity for public hearings,"
EPA's determinations are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, rather than the substantial evidence test applied by the district court. See id. at 1337-38
& n.4.
220. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
221. 18 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2Q1.1 to 2Q2.1 (West Supp. 1993).
222. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(cX2), 1342(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1054 (1992).
223. 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993).
224. Id. at 198.
225. Id. at 199.
226. 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992).
227. Id. at 978.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 979.
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charge emanated from an unpermitted water treatment system
owned by the defendants, and that this was sufficient to sustain the conviction.' °
The third case, United States v. Strandquist,"' involved a
defendant manager of a marina and campground who personally discharged, or directed employees to discharge, untreated
sewage into a storm grate on several occasions when the
marina's septic tanks were full. A jury found him guilty of two
counts of knowing violations of the Clean Water Act, and the
district judge sentenced him to five months imprisonment on
each count, supervised release for one year, and home detention
for five months." The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the government's circumstantial evidence was sufficient to infer
environmental contamination and that the sentence was not excessive.'
The Constitutional right to a jury trial was at issue in Sasser
v. Administrator.' In Sasser, a landowner filled wetlands in
1986 (before the amendment of the Clean Water Act) and was
later charged with violating two EPA orders to cease and desist
filling of wetlands. 5 The defendant refused to submit a restoration plan, and the administrative law judge imposed a fine of
$125,000Y. 6 The Administrator's final order imposing the fine
was appealed to the Fourth Circuit. The defendant argued that
the EPA lacked jurisdiction and that the administrative enforcement action violated his right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment. 7 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the penalty, hold-

230. Id. at 980.
231. 993 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1993).
232. Id. at 398.
233. Id. at 400-01.
234. 990 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1993).
235. Id. at 128-29.
236. Id. at 129.
237. Id. at 129-30. In its 1987 landmark decision Tul v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial as to liability (but not the amount of penalty) in a civil action brought by the government in
federal court to impose penalties for discharge of dredged or fill material into
wetlands. 481 U.S. 412 (1987). However, dictum in its decision recognized precedent
holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings.
Id. at 418 n.4. Additionally, the Court noted that in 1987 Congress amended the
Clean Water Act to authorize the EPA Administrator to assess civil penalties administratively. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(gXl)-(2XB) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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ing that, because the discharge of fill material was a continuing
violation, the EPA had jurisdiction to hear the matter.' In
addition, the court ruled that the dispute was one involving
statutory public rights, and that a jury trial was not guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. 9
In a case related to Sasser v. Administrator, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Sasser' ruled that the "ebb and flow"
test is a proper means of determining the Corps of Engineers'
jurisdiction over tidal waters, even where the waters may not
in fact be navigable."4 Because the waters were within the
Corps' jurisdiction, the owner was required to remove structures
impeding the recreational use of the streams.24 2
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia dismissed a challenge to EPA's approval of Virginia's
water quality standard for dioxin, 1.2 parts per quadrillion in
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA."4s The court found
EPA's review of the criteria to be consistent with the Clean
Water Act.24
C. Attorney General Opinions
The Attorney General opined'
that silvicultural exemptions in the Virginia Wetlands Zoning Ordinance' were not
coextensive with those provided in section 404 of the Clean
Water Act.247 As a result, a state wetlands permit is required
under the ordinance when using logging vehicles outfitted with
balloon flotation tires, to transport timber in a manner that
would destroy wetlands vegetation.'
In addition, the
ordinance's limited exemption for repair or extension of existing
roads does not permit the reconstruction of a long-abandoned

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 129.
Id. at 129-30.
967 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 996.
Id. at 994-95.
806 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Va. 1992).
Id. at 1277.
Op. to Hon. S. Wallace Stieffen, H. Del. Mbr. (Mar. 22, 1993).
VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1302 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1XA) & (E).
Op. to Hon. S. Wallace Stieffen, H. Del. Mbr. (Mar. 22, 1993).
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road where the activity would require the destruction of additional wetlands.249
V.

MISCELLANEOUS ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION

The first reported cases construing the Virginia oil spill stat-

ute"4 arose in federal courts. In Gollobin v. Air Distributing

Co.," 1 the court held that the Code's prohibition of "discharges
of oil into or upon state waters, lands, or storm drain systems
within the Commonwealth" 2 2 applied equally to public or private lands, and that a contractor's failure to cap or seal abandoned tanks gave rise to strict liability for causing a discharge
of oil when an oil jobber filled the abandoned tanks and they
The bankruptcy
overflowed onto the homeowners' farm.'
to private lands
the
statute
applied
court similarly held that
and that a claim for injunctive relief from the debtor's
prepetition and postpetition contamination should be accorded
administrative expense priority under the Bankruptcy Code in
In re Virginia Builders, Inc.'
In Committee of Concerned Citizens for Property Rights v.
Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board, 5 the Virginia Court
of Appeals held that it would not overturn the agency's decision
to enact emergency regulations when its prior regulations had
been invalidated by court action and when the agency found
that the absence of regulations would "potentially result in a
significant quantity of shoreline property being developed withimprovements in...
out... [r]egulations, preventing..,
water quality and potentially resulting in additional degradation of the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries." 6 Moreover, the Governor's failure to sign the regulations before their adoption as required by the Virginia APA was
harmless." Most importantly, the agency's decision to apply

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.34:14 to :23 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
838 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Va. 1993).
VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:18 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
Gollobin, 838 F. Supp. at 258-59.
153 B.R. 729, 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
15 Va. App. 664, 926 S.E.2d 499 (1993).
Id. at 668, 426 S.E.2d at 502.
Id. at 669-70, 426 S.E.2d at 502-03; see VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(CX5)
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the emergency regulations to lots platted on the effective date
of the original regulations and more than one year prior to the
adoption of the emergency regulations was not retroactive
rulemaking because, the court held, any landowners who were
affected had notice of the original regulations and were therefore not harmed.'
VI. CONCLUSION

Over the course of the past two years, significant developments in environmental law affecting Virginians have occurred
primarily in the areas of air quality and waste management. It
is clear that air quality issues are coming to the fore, though
the long term impact of mobile source and Title V operating
permit regulations remains uncertain. As for waste management, Supreme Court precedents continue to reaffirm the Commerce Clause's protection of private sector activity in the field.
Potential liabilities in this area, however, continue to expand as
CERCLA's net reaches outward to influence other legal disciplines, including bankruptcy, estate planning, and corporate
mergers and acquisitions.
It is interesting to note that the decisions of the Fourth Circuit and the federal district courts in Virginia address the most
complex and contemporary issues in environmental litigation. It
is not surprising that most of these occur in connection with
CERCLA. With the statute overdue for reauthorization in this
term of Congress, it remains to be seen whether these decisions
will be codified.

(Repl. Vol. 1993).
258. 15 Va. App. at 672, 426 S.E.2d at 504.

